UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ST. PAUL REINSURANCE COMPANY)
LIMITED LONDON,

Plaintiff(s),

V.

THE FORT MILLER GROUP, INC. and BEECHE SYSTEMS CORPORATION,

Defendant(s).

No. C05-1912 BZ

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS OR TRANSFER

Defendants The Fort Miller Group, Inc. (Fort Miller) and Beeche Systems Corporation (Beeche), move to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and for improper venue. In the alternative, defendants move to transfer this action to the Northern District of New York on the grounds of

 $^{^{\}rm 1}$ All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge for all proceedings including entry of final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \S 636(c).

improper venue or for the convenience of parties and witnesses.

To the extent that Beeche has moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, its motion is **DENIED** as it has admitted in paragraph 7 of its answer that this court has personal jurisdiction over it. The motion of Fort Miller is also DENIED. Plaintiff has submitted unopposed evidence that John Hedbring, the President of Fort Miller, came to California to negotiate the sale of the platforms which ultimately resulted in the lawsuits. Such lawsuits produced the claims for indemnity and defense which gave rise to the plaintiff's complaint for rescission and declaratory relief. As such, Fort Miller can be said to have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in California such that it could expect to be sued here. See Republic Intern. Corp., v. Amco Engineers, Inc., 516 F.2d 161, 167 (9th Cir. 1975) (citing <u>Hanson v. Denckla</u>, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10.

The record is also replete with uncontroverted evidence that Fort Miller exercised substantial control over Beeche's day to day operations and business dealings, including the transaction which gave rise to the underlying actions, down to the level of pricing and delivery decisions. See e.g.

Declarations of Gordon and Piermarini. California law is clear that where a parent company exercises more than ordinary control over the subsidiary such that the subsidiary may be considered an agent, "jurisdiction over the parent may be grounded in the acts of the subsidiary[.]" See Wells Fargo &

Co. v. Wells Fargo Exp. Co., 556 F.2d 406, 419-20 (9th Cir. 1977); Sonora Diamond Corp., v. Superior Court of Tuolumne

County, 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 541 (2000); Rollins Burdick Hunter of So. Cal. Inc., v. Alexander, 206 Cal.App.3d 1, 9-10 (1988);

Mathes v. National Utility Helicopters Ltd., 68 Cal.App.3d

182, 189-90 (1977). Based on the record before me, Fort

Miller's relationship with Beeche exceeds mere ownership and directorship, such that Beeche's activities are imputed to

Fort Miller for jurisdictional purposes.

The motions for improper venue filed by each defendant are likewise **DENIED**. Having found that each defendant corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of California, venue is proper here. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

The motion to transfer to the Northern District of New York is also DENIED. If the complaint pled only the first and second claims, transfer would likely be warranted, as all or most of the witnesses on those claims, especially the third-party brokerage witnesses, appear to reside in the Northern District of New York. However, the complaint pleads a third claim which seeks a declaration that the events for which the defendants seek coverage do not constitute an occurrence within the meaning of the policy and that some of the damages for which defendants seek coverage are otherwise not subject to any insuring agreement. Those events, and the events giving rise to those damages, appear to have occurred in the Northern District of California. Many of the witnesses on these matters are third-party witnesses located in this

district, including officers and employees of the entities that have sued defendants in California for breach of contract and related claims.

Wherever this action is tried, someone will be inconvenienced. Based on the record presented by the plaintiff, which is largely unopposed by the defendants, I find that the inconvenience to third-party witnesses will be about the same regardless which district hears this case. Given the respect due the plaintiff's choice of forum, I find that defendants have not met their burden of making a strong showing of inconvenience justifying transfer. See Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 89 F.R.D. 497, 499 (C.D. Cal. 1981); Judge William W. Schwarzer, et al., <u>Federal</u> Civil Procedure Before Trial, § 4:296 (Rutter Group 2005).

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss or in the alternative to transfer is DENIED.

Dated: November 10, 2005

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United States Magistrate Judge

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